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A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF
NEW YORK'S RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIM
TARA B. MULROONEY*
The rapid proliferation of the news and media industries,
the ascent of tabloid journalism, and the increasing use of
celebrities in advertising campaigns have brought intellectual
property concerns to the forefront of legal debate. The right of
publicity claim, which concerns an individual's right to
commercially control his or her image,' is one such issue
receiving increased attention. Having recently gained
recognition as an independent claim in the latter half of this
century, the substance and shape of publicity rights have yet to
be clearly settled and vary greatly among jurisdictions. In an
attempt to codify the concepts of the right of publicity claim,
some states have established various, and often inconsistent,
standards as to the scope and nature of this right. Other
jurisdictions have continued to rely solely on common law
publicity rights.2 Within this legal framework, this Note will
analyze New York's publicity rights claim,3 which is incorporated
within its right to privacy statute. Taking into account the
patchwork of various state laws, in addition to legal commentary
on the subject, this Note maintains that New York should
establish a separate and distinct property-based right of
publicity claim.
To better understand the nature of this newly recognized
cause of action; this Note will first provide a general overview of
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.A.,
Georgetown University.
1 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIvACY at v (2d.
ed. 2000).
2 See Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal
Right of Publicity Statute, 9 J. ART & ENT. L. 227,231, 235 (1999) (stating that
"[i]nstead of waiting for the courts to fully develop this evolving area of law,
[many] state legislatures have created their own statutory laws" concerning
publicity rights and reporting that "the right of publicity is recognized as
existing under the common law of sixteen states").
3 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50-51 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000).
1139
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the right of publicity claim. It will define the term "right of
publicity" and examine the origins and justifications for its
recognition and development. In addition, it will describe the
development of the claim and set forth the current state of the
law. Second, this Note will specifically examine the right of
publicity claim as it currently exists in New York. It will follow
New York case law on the issue and provide an in-depth
examination of sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights
Law,4 the privacy statute in which publicity rights are
incorporated. Third, this Note will reveal the shortcomings of
sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. In so
doing, the New York claim will be compared to California's more
broadly defined property based publicity claim, 5  thus
highlighting the numerous advantages of the California statute.
Fourth, this Note will address the constitutional limitations on a
person's right of publicity and will propose that such limitations
serve to address many of the concerns often raised by those
opposed to enacting a more broadly defined right of publicity
claim in New York. Finally, this Note will conclude that the
establishment of a separate property-based claim would better
represent the ideals encompassed within the right of publicity
cause of action-namely, to provide individuals with more
adequate protection and increase predictability in the law. 6 The
bill to amend the New York Civil Rights Law by adding a new
Article 5-b, which was proposed by Senator Emmanuel Gold in
1995, 7 will be set forth as a model of a statutorily-defined
property based right that should be adopted by the New York
legislature.
"An entire industry has developed around the
merchandising and commercial exploitation of endorsements
which often surpass the monies earned directly through
4 See id.
r See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(e) (Deering Supp. 2000).
6 The need for consistency and predictability is imperative, given the fact
that the state of the law in this area is extremely confused and has even been
referred to as a "haystack in a hurricane." Ettore v. Philco Tel. Broad. Corp.,
229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956); see also Leonard M. Marks & Robert P.
Mulvey, Celebrity Rights Law Needed in New York, N.Y. L.J. Nov. 6, 1995, at 1.
7 See Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 1, 4 (stating that the proposed bill
was much like its California counterpart in that it would last 50 years after the
death of the personality, was freely transferable, and punitive damages would
be available for willful violators).
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performance by entertainers and sports stars."8 In light of this
current explosion in the intermingling of the media,
entertainment, and advertising industries, it is imperative that
an individual's right to protect and capitalize upon their own
image is safeguarded, as image is the celebrity's most expressive
and valuable resource. Thus, now more than ever, it is vital that
New York clarify and broaden an individual's right of publicity
claim to ensure that individuals gain adequate protection for
their most precious and intimate commodity-their identities. A
separate and distinct property-based right of publicity would
fulfill that goal.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A GENERAL OVERVIEW
"The right of publicity is... the inherent right of every
human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity."9 The right is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "the
right of [an] individual, especially [a] public figure or celebrity, to
control [the] commercial value and exploitation of his name or
picture or likeness or to prevent others from unfairly
appropriating that value for their [own] commercial benefit."10
"This legal right is infringed by unpermitted use which damages
the commercial value of this inherent human right of identity
and which is not immunized by principles of free press and free
speech.""
The right, which is now recognized as the right of publicity,
was originally rooted in privacy law.12 In 1890, an extremely
influential and groundbreaking law review article entitled The
Right to Privacy, written by Louis Brandeis and Charles Warren,
first introduced the concept of a right of publicity.13 The historic
article, which initially recognized an individual's "right 'to be let
8 Id. at 4.
9 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at v.
10 BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1325 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Presley's Estate v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981)).
11 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at v; see also Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438
N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1010 (1st Dep't 1981) (stating that the distinguishing feature of
the right to publicity is the use of the plaintiffs protected right for the direct
commercial advantage of the defendant).
12 See Goodman, supra note 2, at 229.
13 See Louis Brandeis & Charles Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
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alone,' "14 laid the groundwork for both the recognition of privacy
law and the initial ideas embedded in publicity rights. The
article acknowledged that "privacy rights include one's right to
ordinarily determine 'to what extent his thoughts, sentiments,
and emotions shall be communicated to others.' "Is "Until [this
time], one's right to control the publicity of his or her persona
had not been clearly defined or expressed as an actionable
right." 6 Thus, "[allthough Warren and Brandeis did not refer to
this right as one of publicity, their article is credited with being
the birthplace for the doctrine." i7
Since the introduction of these concepts, the rights of both
privacy and publicity have greatly evolved. Yet, for the first half
of this century, privacy rights remained the primary means of
enforcing one's right of publicity, as publicity rights did not gain
independent recognition until the 1950s.18 Traditionally, courts
confronted with the issue of "unpermitted commercial use of a
person's identity," used tort law concepts of "personal injury to
dignity and state of mind" to address the plaintiffs harm.' 9 As
more and more cases began to involve the "celebrity plaintiff,"
however, it became evident that privacy law was inadequate to
accommodate "uncompensated, rather than unwelcome,
publicity."20
Since an invasion of the right and the measure of damages
in a privacy claim is based upon the indignity and personal
affront of having one's identity spread into the public, courts
14 Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS
29 (2d ed. 1888)).
15 Goodman, supra note 2, at 230. The article recognized that "[w]hile
privacy rights prohibited one from unnecessarily looking into the privacy of
another's life, publicity rights would prohibit one from exploiting another's life
in public." Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953). The court stated that "in addition to and independent of that
right of privacy... a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph,"
and further stated that "[tihis right might be called a 'right of publicity.' " Id;
see also Goodman, supra note 2, at 233 (stating that "Itihe term 'right of
publicity' was first coined in 1953, in the now landmark case of Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.").
19 J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A
Tribute, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1987).
20 Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REv. 603, 622 (1984); see
also McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1706.
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were reluctant, and often unwilling, to allow a famous person
whose identity was already in widespread use throughout the
media to claim that an unauthorized commercial use of their
identity invaded a "right to be let alone."21 On the contrary, the
celebrity persona often craves and seeks out public attention so
that "the publicity is not, of itself, unwelcome."22 Thus, in many
cases, it is an anomaly to apply privacy concepts of mental
distress and emotional harm caused by the public attention to a
"publicity" wrong. Judges often refused to accept the proposition
that the person who purposefully thrusts himself into the public
eye suffered such harms.23  In a publicity rights suit, the
plaintiffs complaint is not so much the violation of their right to
be let alone, but rather that the plaintiff was deprived of the
financial gain reaped from that publication. Thus, in such
instances, plaintiffs do not seek compensation for mental or
emotional distress, but rather compensation based on revenues
flowing from the defendant's unauthorized use of their
personas.24 The inadequacy of privacy law to accommodate
compensation for the unauthorized use of a public person's
identity became increasingly evident.25
While the inability of privacy laws to accommodate
"publicity" wrongs was being revealed, numerous arguments
supporting a right to protect the commercial exploitation of one's
identity began to emerge.26 The justifications for establishing a
21 See McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1705 ("Courts were unwilling to allow a
public person to claim that [such uses] invaded a 'right to be left alone' ").
22 Goodman, supra note 2, at 293.
2 See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188,
1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Plaintiffs' claims fail under [a privacy cause of action]
for as public figures, with their likenesses, names and images already in the
public domain, they have waived their rights to claim intrusions into their
common law privacy rights.").
24 See Denicola, supra note 20, at 622 (stating that "[riemedies linked to
mental distress clearly were inadequate when the real complaint was
uncompensated, rather than unwelcome, publicity").
25 See McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1706 (stating that the failure of privacy
laws to accommodate a claim against a defendant for the unauthorized
commercial use of one's identity left the situation "ripe for a break in
traditional thinking").
26 See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,
834 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he right of privacy generally protect[s] the right 'to be
let alone,' while the right of publicity protects the celebrity's pecuniary interest
in the commercial exploitation of his identity. Thus the right of privacy and the
right of publicity protect fundamentally different interests and must be
analyzed separately.").
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new right that would protect against the unauthorized
commercial exploitation of one's identity fall into three main
categories: (1) the moral argument for the recognition of such a
right, (2) economic concerns, and (3) public interest concerns. 27
The moral argument focuses mainly on the failure of privacy
laws to adequately address the plaintiffs harm.28 The two
aspects of the moral argument for the recognition of a right of
publicity cause of action are: the notion of unjust enrichment and
the equitable policy of 'labor desserts."29 The unjust enrichment
aspect of this argument stresses the "injustice of permitting
strangers to reap [benefits] where they have not sown."30 In
other words, a defendant should not be allowed to enjoy the
rewards of that which he himself has not worked for.
The labor-dessert rationale focuses instead on the injustice
to the plaintiff, arguing that people should be entitled to "reap
the rewards of [their] endeavors."3i Advocates of the right of
publicity who focus on this labor theory of justification state that
the right of publicity stems from the axiom of Anglo-American
jurisprudence which holds that "every person is entitled to the
fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing
public policy considerations."32 This argument maintains that "a
person who has 'long and laboriously nurtured the fruit of
publicity values,' who has expended 'time, effort, skill, and even
money' in their creation," should be entitled to reap the financial
27 See Paul Cirino, Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New
York and California, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 763, 766-67 (1994).
28 See id.
29 See id. (stating that "[t]he moral aspect [of the justifications for the right
of publicity] centers on the prevention of unjust enrichment and the equitable
policy of enabling successful persons to reap the rewards of their labor").
30 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 181 (1993); see also Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) ("The rationale for
protecting the right of publicity is a straight-forward one of preventing unjust
enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value
and for which he would normally pay.").
31 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (noting that the state's interest in the
protection of the right of publicity is to ensure "the right of the individual to
reap the reward of his endeavors, and [has] little to do with protecting feelings
or reputation"); see also Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1010 (1st
Dep't 1981) (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573).
32 Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203, 216 (1954).
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benefits stemming from their identity for themselves. 33 Both
aspects of this equity-driven rationale have been cited frequently
by courts as justification for the right of publicity claim.3 4
In addition to the moral argument justifying the right of
publicity claim, advocates have also cited the economic need for
its existence. The economic argument highlights the need to
protect the economic value of the celebrity's identity in order to
stimulate creative effort and achievement. 35 Unless mental
labor and inventiveness are rewarded, people will cease to
produce creative works, for without the certainty that they will
be able to keep the benefits of their hard work and talent,
individuals will have little motivation to produce socially
desirable services and products. 36 Proponents of the right of
publicity point out that the right encourages people "to become
successful by assuring them that no one may use the increased
value of their persona without their permission."37 Thus, a
public interest argument flows directly from the economic
justification of the right-the incentive benefits the public
because it encourages effort, creativity, and achievement in
entertainment, athletics, and other related fields.
There is one final aspect of the public interest argument
that is sometimes raised in support of protecting an individual's
right to control the commercial use of his or her identity-the
3 Madow, supra note 30, at 181 (stating that "[tihe basis most frequently
and confidently advanced by courts [in justifying the recognition of the right of
publicity] is the labor theory on which Nimmer originally relied"); see also
Nimmer, supra note 32, at 216.
•4 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576; Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Brinkley, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
1010.
35 See McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1710-11.
36 See Cirino, supra note 27, at 767 (posing the question, "why should a
celebrity work to achieve superstar status only to have others reap all the
endorsement profit?").
37 Id; see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438, 441 (Cal.
1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The Lugosi dissent stated:
Often considerable money, time, and energy are needed to develop one's
prominence in a particular field. Years of labor may be required before
one's skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently developed to
permit an economic return through some medium of commercial
promotion ... providing legal protection for the economic value in one's
identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful
incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or
achievements prerequisite to public recognition ....
11452000]
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consumer protection justification. This view reasons that
allowing the appropriation of a celebrity persona without his or
her consent may mislead the public into believing such person
actually endorses the product or service being advertised when,
in fact, he or she may not. Thus, there exists the possibility of
deceptive advertising in that advertisers may lure consumers
into purchasing their product or service because the consumers
believe that the celebrity, whose image is being appropriated,
actually endorses what is being advertised. 38
In light of both the inadequacies of privacy law in
compensating for the unauthorized commercial use of one's
identity and the strong policy arguments justifying the need for
its existence, the inevitable occurred when the right of publicity
finally gained independent recognition in 1953. In the seminal
case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,39
Judge Jerome Frank first coined the term "right of publicity."40
Haelan involved a chewing gum manufacturer's contract for the
exclusive use of a professional baseball player's photograph in
connection with selling the manufacturer's chewing gum. The
player agreed not to grant any gum manufacturer the right to
use his photo for a designated term. The defendant was a
competing gum manufacturer who wanted to use the baseball
player's image for advertisements. 41 The court rejected the
defendant's contention that a man has no legal interest in the
publication of his picture other than his right "not to have his
feelings hurt by [the] publication."42 The court maintained that,
"in addition to and independent of that right of privacy.., a
man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph .... -43
Judge Frank further stated that this right might be called a
"right of publicity."44 In arguing for the acknowledgment of such
38 See Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case for
Privileged Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 244
(1994-95).
39 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
40 Id. at 868 (stating "this right might be called a 'right of publicity' ").
41 See id. at 867.
42 Id. at 868 (addressing the defendant's contention that none of the
plaintiff's contracts created more than a release of liability "because a man has
no legal interest in the publication of his picture other that his right of privacy,
i.e., a personal and non-assignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such a
publication").
43 Id.
44 Id.
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a right, Judge Frank pointed out that "many prominent persons
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses,
would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances,
displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains and
subways."45
Thus, Judge Frank utilized the publicity right as a way to
"avoid the awkward and illogical jump"46 that was necessary to
provide relief for a public figure who complained of an invasion
of privacy whenever his or her celebrityhood was
misappropriated. In realizing the inappropriateness of having
the only claim available to such plaintiffs be that they were
emotionally injured by the exposure, the Haelan decision opened
the way for "publicity-seeking people" to gain control over the
"associate value" of their names and faces. 47 The parameters of
this new property right were studied and defined in a highly
influential law review article written by Melville B. Nimmer
entitled, The Right of Publicity.48 Nimmer's 1954 article, which
was to become the "cornerstone of the right of publicity,"49
portrayed the deficiencies in privacy law relating to the
protection of an individual's commercial interest in his or her
identity. In arguing that what the celebrity needed was not
protection against unreasonable intrusion into privacy, but
rather some right to control the commercial use of identity,
Nimmer's eloquent endorsement for a right of publicity helped
give the newly recognized claim legitimacy and credibility.50
45 Id.
46 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of
Publicity?, 9 J. ART & ENT. L. 35, 44 (1998). In her article, Zimmerman stated
that Judge Frank used the Haelan case "as an opportunity to transform the
appropriation tort into a form he deemed more suitable to the needs of famous
.people." Id.
47 Id. (citing Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an
Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 853, 864-69 (1995)); see also Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 1199, 1203-15 (1986)).
48 See Nimmer, supra note 32.
49 McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1706.
5o See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at 1.27 ("If Judge Frank was the architect
of a 'right of publicity,' then Professor Nimmer was the first builder."); see also
McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1704 (maintaining that Nimmer's seminal 1954
article laid the foundation for the right of publicity, "and all subsequent case
20001 1147
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The common law right of publicity has evolved since its
recognition in the 1950s, and currently sixteen states recognize
this right as existing under common law.51 In addition, at least
fifteen states have codified the common law through statutes
that recognize one's right of publicity.52 The right of publicity
has also gained recognition in both the Restatement of Torts53
and the Restatement of Unfair Competition. 54
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN NEW YORK
Although New York was an early leader in the advancement
of publicity rights, the recognition of the right has rapidly
declined and is now confined within the strictures of a narrowly
defined privacy statute.55 The development of the right of
publicity claim in New York began with a 1902 case, Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co.56 In this case, the picture of a young
woman, who was still a minor, was used in an advertisement for
the defendant's flour company. The young Abigail Roberson's
likeness had been reproduced and used by the defendant for
law and commentary has built upon this foundation," something that few law
review articles are able to accomplish).
51 See Goodman, supra note 2, at 231 (stating that the courts of California,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and
Wisconsin have all recognized the existence of a common law right of publicity).
52 See id. at 236 (citing CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West 1998); FLA.
STAT. § 540.08 (1997); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-13-1-1 to 32-13-1-20 (West 1998);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 214, § 3a (West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 597.770-.810 (Michie 1997); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 839.1-.3 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108 (1997); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§
26.001-.015 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to 45-3-6 (1998); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-.40 (Michie 1998); WIs. STAT. § 895.50 (1997)).
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A-D (1977) (breaking down
the privacy tort into four distinct categories: intrusion into one's physical
solitude, publicity placing someone in a false light, public disclosure of private
facts, and appropriation of one's name and likeness to another's advantage); see
also Goodman, supra note 2, at 234 (stating that "it is [this] fourth type of
privacy tort that protects one's right of publicity").
54 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (defining
the tort of "Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The
Right of Publicity" and stating that one who appropriates the commercial
name, likeness, or other indicia of a person's identity for purposes of trade is
subject to liability); see also Goodman, supra note 2, at 234.
55 See N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1999).
56 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
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advertising purposes in more than 25,000 prints and
photographs without her permission.5 7 Her suit for invasion of
privacy was dismissed by the court, which held that "in the
absence of legislation, the plaintiff and her legal guardian had no
cause of action."58
Public outcry over the perceived unfairness of the decision
led to a rapid response by the New York State legislature.
Within a year of the Roberson decision, New York enacted
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law entitled "Right of
Privacy."59 The statutorily created right prohibits the use of a
person's name, picture, or likeness for advertising or trade
purposes. 60 Section 50 provides for criminal penalties for such
prohibited use while section 51 gives the individual victim of
such appropriation the right to obtain an injunction and bring a
cause of action to obtain compensatory and exemplary
damages. 61
Before delving into an analysis of New York Civil Rights
Law sections 50 and 51, it is important to address the fact that
New York does not recognize a common law right of publicity.62
Thus, sections 50 and 51 provide a plaintiffs sole basis for relief.
It is rather ironic that it took a New York federal court to first
acknowledge an independent right of publicity63 while today New
York State courts have consistently refused to recognize such a
57 See id. at 442.
58 Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 4; see also Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 543-
44, 64 N.E. at 443.
59 See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that public response over the seemingly unfair decision in Roberson
resulted in the enactment of sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law); see
also Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 4.
6o See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1999).
61 See id.; see also Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 4.
62 See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584
(N.Y. 1984) (stating that the right of publicity is exclusively statutory in New
York and the plaintiff could not claim an independent common law right of
publicity); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 435, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009 (1st Dep't
1981) (stating that New York state courts had never explicitly recognized a
non-statutory right of publicity); see also Marks and Mulvey, supra note 6, at 1
(tracing the development of New York's privacy statute and the "rise and
decline of a right of publicity in New York").
63 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953); see also Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that in
Haelan, the federal courts of New York were the first to recognize an
independent common law right protecting plaintiffs' economic interests).
2000] 1149
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common law right.64 Following the Haelan decision, federal
courts continued to interpret New York law in this area as
recognizing a common law right of publicity.65
Despite the favorable treatment publicity rights experienced
in the federal courts, New York State courts have repeatedly
asserted that New York does not recognize a common law right
of publicity. Since 1903, New York State courts have "expressly
and repeatedly renounced any judge-made right to a remedy for
the unauthorized appropriation of a person's name or likeness."66
For example, in the 1984 case of Stephano v. News Group
Publications, Inc.,67 the court held that since the right of
publicity is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an
aspect of the right to privacy, which is exclusively statutory in
the State of New York, "the plaintiff cannot claim an
independent common-law right of publicity."6 8  Subsequent
cases, such as the 1987 case of Welch v. Group W. Products Inc. ,69
the 1989 case of James v. Delilah Films, Inc.,70 and Dana v. Oak
Park Marina, Inc. ,71 have agreed with the Stephano court's
finding that New York does not recognize a common law right of
publicity claim.72
61 See Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 480 N.E.2d 349, 353 (N.Y. 1985);
Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584; Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d
1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982); Brinkley, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1009; Frosch v. Grosset &
Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (1st Dep't 1980); see also Marks & Mulvey,
supra note 6, at 1.
65 See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir.
1978); Groucho Marx Prod., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487-89
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
66 Cirino, supra note 27, at 771-72; see also Arrington, 434 N.E.2d at 1321
(stating that there is no support for the existence of a common law right of
privacy in New York).
67 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984). This case involved a claim brought by a
professional male model against the defendant for violating both N.Y. Civil
Rights Law section 50 and his common law right to publicity by publishing a
picture of the plaintiff modeling a "bomber jacket" in a magazine for trade and
advertising purchases without the plaintiff's consent. See id. at 581.
63 Id. at 584.
69 525 N.Y.S.2d 466, 468 n.1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987).
70 544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
71 660 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (4th Dep't 1997) (holding that the right to privacy
in New York is governed exclusively by Civil Rights Law 50 and 51, and that
there is no additional common law protection).
72 See Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, (N.Y.
1982); Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 382 N.E.2d 1145, 1146 n.2 (N.Y. 1978);
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The right to control the commercial use of one's identity
must come solely under Article 5, sections 50 and 51 of the New
York Civil Rights Law. 73 Section 50 states:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising
purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or
picture of any living person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent
or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor.74
Section 51 provides:
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used
within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without the written consent first obtained as above
provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme
court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so
using his name, portrait, picture or voice, to prevent and
restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages
for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the
defendant shall have knowingly used such person's name,
portrait, picture or voice in such manner as is forbidden or
declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the jury,
in its discretion, may award exemplary damages. 75
Thus, in order for a plaintiff to make out a claim under
sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights statute, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant (1) used plaintiffs name, portrait,
picture, or voice; (2) for the purposes of advertising or trade; and
(3) without the plaintiffs written consent. 76
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1984); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Adirondack Group, 476 N.Y.S.2d 716, 720
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (stating that all cases cited supporting the "alleged
right of publicity are in the Federal courts or courts of other States"); see also
Cirino, supra note 27, at 771-72.
73 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1999); see also Cirino,
supra note 27, at 777.
74 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1999).
75 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000) (amended
Nov. 1, 1995). It is important to note that Section 51 was recently amended to
include protection of the voice. Prior to 1995, a person's name, portrait, or
picture was the only characteristics of one's persona that were protected. This
amendment helped broaden the scope of protection afforded to individuals in
controlling the commercial use of their identity. This Note, however, still
maintains that the right, as recognized in New York today, nonetheless fails to
provide the "celebrity plaintiff' adequate protection.
76 See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1984);
Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307, 308, (N.Y. 1984); see also
Goodman, supra note 2, at 239.
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Since New York has elected to restrict the concept of
publicity rights within the strictures of its narrow right of
privacy statute, a person's right to control the commercial use of
his or her image is very limited in New York. Privacy rights are
inherently personal in nature."7 It is widely recognized that the
very nature of a personal right prohibits it from being sold or
given to someone else, or from surviving the lifetime of the
protected individual.78 Since New York recognizes the right of
not having one's identity commercially appropriated without
written authorization as a privacy right, it follows that this right
is neither transferable nor descendible. Thus, under sections 50
and 51, an individual cannot assign these rights to anyone, nor
can an individual's estate sue for the violation of such rights.
This fact was illustrated by the court's decision in James v.
Delilah Films7 9 a case involving an action under sections 50 and
51 for the misappropriation of the plaintiffs' likeness for
marketing and advertising purposes. The plaintiffs in this case
were the predecessors in interest of some 1960s popular music
performers collectively known as the "girl groups." The
defendant, Delilah Films, produced, marketed, and advertised a
film and video containing footage of these groups performing,
without first obtaining the performers' consent.8 0 The court held
that these plaintiffs, as successors in interest, had "no cause of
action under Civil Rights Law .. . sections 50 [and] 51, as the
statutory rights created by said law do not survive death."8' The
court stressed the fact that whatever invasion of privacy actions
the performers may have had, those rights "extinguished at their
deaths."8 2 Numerous court decisions interpreting the statutory
right support the Delilah court's contention that a cause of
77 See Zimmerman, supra note 46, at 37-38 (stating that "personality" has
been protected as a personal interest under the law of privacy since the 1950s);
see also Nimmer, supra note 32, at 209 (stating that privacy could never be the
foundation of a commercial market for "publicity values" because the law
defined privacy as a personal and non-assignable right).
78 See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 209 (stating that a prominent person's
name and portrait-their publicity value-is greatly restricted and cannot be
assigned to others).
79 544 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
80 See id. at 449.
81 Id. at 451. The invasion of privacy causes of action interposed on behalf
of the deceased performers were dismissed because such causes of action
terminated upon their deaths. See id.
82 Id.
1152 [Vol.74:1139
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
action under Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 is not
descendible.8 3  Since the right under the statute is purely
personal and may be enforced only by the actual person whose
name or likeness is used, it naturally follows that the right is not
transferable.8 4  Therefore, under privacy law, a grant to a
commercial advertiser would be "no more than a release or
waiver of the right to sue"a5 for privacy invasion. The
commercial firm would have no legally enforceable right against
a third party.
The New York statute provides clear notice of the scope of
the right by listing the personal attributes that are to be
protected from unauthorized commercial use.8 6 The statute
protects only the person's "most fundamental personal
attributes-name and likeness-those by which he is known and
recognized on a daily basis and which are most valuable."87 Up
until 1995, it listed only three items as being the sole attributes
protected by the state against unauthorized commercial use:
name, photograph, and picture.88  In 1995, the New York
83 See Pirone v. Macillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding
that the statute's right to privacy protection is "clearly limited to 'any living
person' "); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279, 284-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds after remand, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1987); Smith v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 499 N.Y.S.2d 167, 168
(2d Dep't 1986); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1010 (1st Dep't
1981) (stating that although other courts applying New York law have found
the right of publicity to be a valid transferable property right, New York courts
have found the statutory right of privacy to be neither descendible nor
assignable); Antonetty v. Cuomo, 502 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1986).
84 See Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968) (holding that the right of privacy "is a purely
personal one which may be enforced only by the party himself'); Zimmerman,
supra note 46, at 41 n.19 (stating that the right cannot be sold or given to
someone).
85 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at 10-82 §10:53.
s3 See Cirino, supra note 27, at 778.
87 Id.
88 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1909, amd., 1911, 1921,
1979, 1983); see also Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 129 (2d Cir.
1984) (stating that the statute covers any person whose "name, portrait or
picture" is used for trade or advertising purposes without consent); Arrington v.
New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1982) (stating that these
sections were narrowly defined to include "only the commercial use of an
individual's name and likeness and no more"); Brinkley, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1007
n.4 (stating that Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law provides "[a]ny person
whose name, portrait or picture is used"); see also Cirino, supra note 27, at 764
n.8.
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legislature expanded the scope of the statute "to include a cause
of action for the misappropriation of one's voice."8 9 This small
refinement granted individuals significant additional protection
against the unauthorized commercial use of their personas. Two
other important factors should be noted when discussing the
scope of sections 50 and 51. First, the use must be "for
advertising purposes, or for the purpose of trade."90 Second, the
use must contain a clear, recognizable representation of the
plaintiff.91
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF NEW YORK'S STATUTORY RIGHT
The New York "publicity right" claim greatly limits the
ability of an individual to effectively control the commercial
exploitation of his or her persona because the claim is rooted
within a right of privacy statute. Upon comparing the New York
right with a property-based statutory right, such as those
recognized in California 92 and New Jersey,93 the shortcomings of
a publicity right subsumed in privacy law become evident. The
most significant shortcoming is that because the New York right
is rooted in privacy law, it fails to allow for either transferability
89 Goodman, supra note 2, at 235-36; see also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-
51 (McKinney 1992) (amended 1995).
90 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1999); see also Beverley v. Choices
Women's Med. Ctr., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that "[u]se for
'advertising purposes' and use 'for the purposes of trade' are separate and
distinct statutory concepts and violations"); McGraw v. Watkins, 373 N.Y.S.2d
663, 665 (3d Dep't 1975) (stating that whether a picture depicting the plaintiff
naked was used for advertising purposes, was essential to the determination of
whether the right of privacy had been violated); Fleischer v. W.P.I.X., Inc., 213
N.Y.S.2d 632, 647 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961).
91 See Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(holding that a picture used for advertising purposes is not actionable unless it
is "a clear representation of the plaintiff, recognizable from the advertisement
itself"); Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 932-34 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1995) (stating that baseball players could assert claims for defendant's
use of a team picture, even though the reproduction was of poor quality and the
player's faces were small, because the individual players were identifiable in
the picture).
92 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (Deering 1990).
93 See Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J.
1981) (holding that a claim based on the appropriation of a plaintiff's likeness
and name for the defendant's commercial gain is "an action for invasion of their
'property' rights and not one for 'injury to the person' "); see also Larry Moore,
Regulating Publicity: Does Elvis Want Privacy?, 5 J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 36 (1995)
(stating that New Jersey's right to privacy is a common law right).
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or descendibility of a publicity right claim. In characterizing this
as a property-based right, rather than a personal right that is
attached to the individual, it is "capable of being disassociated
from the individual and transferred by him for commercial
purposes."94 Numerous advantages are posed by allowing for a
transferable and descendible right of publicity.
One principal argument in favor of a transferable right is
that "transferability promotes economic creation incentives by
allowing those who hold the right to exploit it to their
advantage. 95 Proponents of a transferable right of publicity
point to the transferability and assignability of other intellectual
property interests such as copyright, trademark, and patents,
and how transferability in these instances has proven to promote
economic efficiency.96 Allowing celebrities to license or assign
their images as they see fit enables them to fully utilize their
images to reap maximum commercial benefits. Providing
celebrities with this additional control over their personas thus
serves to increase the "investment of resources in one's
profession."97
Likewise, descendibility better ensures that individuals will
make investments in themselves that serve the public interest.
A descendible publicity right would allow an individual to
transfer the benefits of his or her labor to a chosen successor;
thereby assuring that the right is vested in a "suitable
beneficiary."98 This trusted beneficiary will have incentive to
preserve the image that the decedent has labored so hard to
create and thereby also reap the financial benefits of that image.
Proponents who advocate for the recognition of a descendible
right argue that "[ilt cannot be seriously disputed that artistic
incentives will be enhanced and furthered if performers are
secure in the knowledge that the valuable image they cultivate
94 Estate ofElvis Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1354-55.
95 J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a
Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. ReV. 1179, 1205 (1987) (discussing the need for a
transferable right of publicity law).
96 See id. (stating that the value of a publicity right may be greatly
diminished if the right were not transferable); see also Goodman, supra note 2,
at 257 (citing Assignee Rights in Patent and Trademark, 37 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1998),
17 U.S.C. § 204 (1998)).
97 Estate ofElvis Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1355.
98 Id. (stating that a right which is descendible assures the individual that
"control over the exercise of the right can be vested in a suitable beneficiary").
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in their lifetimes will be protected and commercially exploited
only by their chosen representatives after they die."99 In fact, in
some cases, passing on property to others may have "as great a
motivational effect" as acquiring property for oneself. 00
Individuals are often motivated to succeed in order to provide for
the financial security and prosperity of their families and heirs.
Equitable considerations also support the argument that it
is only fair that this valuable asset pass to the heirs of the
performer, entertainer, or celebrity who laboriously cultivated
the image throughout his or her lifetime.' 0 ' It does not seem
rational that upon a celebrity's death, advertisers and
expropriators should receive a windfall by having the freedom to
use, with impunity, the image of the celebrity. Rather, in the
interest of fairness, such benefits should fall to the heirs of the
celebrity, as is the case with most other forms of property. The
state should be more concerned with protecting the financial
security of the decedent's family rather than enacting a right
favoring expropriators. These arguments are especially
persuasive considering that for many celebrities, their popularity
survives their death. There is still a large profit to be made off
the commercial appropriation of deceased celebrities'
identities. 0 2 This is evident in the recent media frenzy over the
deaths of such celebrities as Princess Diana, John F. Kennedy,
Jr., Carolyn Bessette, and in the continuing use of the images of
such pop-culture icons as Elvis Presley, John Wayne, and
Marilyn Monroe in the advertising and marketing industries.
Thus, both incentive-driven arguments and equity concerns
favor a descendible right whereby the celebrity can pass these
potential financial benefits to his or her heirs or beneficiaries.
Finally, it is important to note that much of the commentary
against recognizing a descendible right of publicity involves the
fear that development of such a right would interfere with free
speech and the public's ability to access information. 0 3 Yet, as
99 Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 4.
100 Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of
Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J., 1125, 1128-29
(1980).
101 See Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 453, 480-81 (1983).
102 See Estate of Elvis Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1348 (stating that "Elvis
Presley's popularity did not cease upon his death").
103 See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 100, at 1128-32 (stating that publicity
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section IV of this Note will discuss, a descendible right of
publicity can be limited in response to such First Amendment
concerns by explicitly stating such limitations in the wording of
the statute. For instance, a statute could provide for a
"newsworthiness" exception and limit the publicity right for
strictly commercial use. In addition, modeling the inherited
right of publicity on copyright law would address many of the
concerns raised by opponents of a descendible right. Copyright
law balances the tension that exists between the promotion of
creative efforts and First Amendment interests by indicating an
express period of duration when the right vests in the heirs.
After the expiration of such period, the work enters the public
domain. Such a limitation could be placed on the descendible
right of publicity to address whatever First Amendment conflicts
a perpetual publicity interest may pose.
California, for example, has passed legislation to ensure the
protection of a descendible right of publicity. 1 4 California Civil
Code section 990 creates a property-based, descendible right of
publicity in an individual's likeness when such use "has
commercial value at the time of his or her death."10 5 To address
First Amendment concerns raised by a perpetual right of
publicity, the California statute follows the model provided by
copyright law, limiting the period of time in which a cause of
action may be brought under this section to "50 years from the
death of the deceased personality."10 6 The law also conditions
the right to bring an action on registration of the persona by
rights must be weighed against the countervailing policy of First Amendment
interest in the free use of information).
104 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 990 (Deering 1990); see also Goodman, supra note
2, at 237-38 (stating that in 1985, California enacted legislation to codify the
publicity rights of deceased individuals).
105 CAL. CML CODE § 990(h) (Deering 1990). Section 990(h) states:
As used in this section, "deceased personality" means any natural person
whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial
value at the time of his or her death, whether or not during the lifetime of
that natural person the person used his or her name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for
purposes of advertising or selling, or solicitation of purchase of, products,
merchandise, goods or service.
Id.
106 CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (Deering 1990) ("No action shall be brought
under this section by reason of any use of a deceased personality's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness occurring after the expiration of 50 years from
the death of the deceased personality".).
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requiring the successor in interest to pay a ten dollar filing fee to
register a claim to the defendant's persona with the Secretary of
California.10 7 This requirement is a way to help ensure the
public's access to the individual's persona, in the same manner
that copyright registration requirements sought to
counterbalance First Amendment concerns.108 California's Civil
Code section 990 provides an excellent model for New York to
follow because it provides for a descendible right of publicity that
promotes creative incentive and equity concerns, while at the
same time avoiding conflicts with the First Amendment.
Originally, the scope of the New York claim of unauthorized
appropriation of identity was limited to use of an individual's
name, portrait, or picture. 10 9 Many of the concerns that such a
right did not afford adequate protection have been addressed by
recent amendments to New York Civil Rights Law sections 50
and 51.110 The current statute now provides for the
misappropriation of one's voice. It reads:
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used
within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of
trade without the written consent first obtained as above
provided may maintain an equitable action in the supreme
court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so
using his name, portrait, picture or voice .... 11 I
By providing for the recognition of the appropriation of one's
voice, the New York legislature greatly expanded the scope of the
right and afforded individuals some much-needed additional
protection. This amendment is especially significant for singers,
radio personalities, and others identified through their voice w
had received insufficient protection under the statute as it
existed prior to the amendments. 112
107 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(f) (Deering 1990); see also Goodman, supra
note 2, at 238.
108 See Felcher & Rubin. supra note 100, at 1130-32 (stating that recourse
to a copyright analogy to the right of publicity would solve most of the First
Amendment concerns).
109 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992); see also Cirino,
supra note 27, at 777 (stating that ninety years after the legislature enacted a
remedy for unauthorized commercial use, "the law in New York remains the
same: persons can sue only for appropriations of 'name, portrait or picture' ").
110 See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 100, at 765.
HI N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 2000).
112 Compare Maxwell v. N.W. Ayer, Inc., 605 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1993) (rejecting the plaintiffs claim for the misappropriation of his
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Despite this additional safeguard, New York still provides
less protection than other jurisdictions. For example,
California's statute adds a person's signature to the list of
protected attributes, and federal courts interpreting the common
law right of publicity have found "likeness" to include
"[tiransitory adjuncts of personality" such as hairstyle, dress,
and mannerisms. 113 In White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.,114 the court held that appropriation of identity "goes beyond
protection of name or likeness and includes the unauthorized use
of attributes that leave no doubt as to whom those attributes
belong."115 Thus, the court concluded that Wheel of Fortune
game show hostess Vanna White did have a valid claim for
unauthorized commercial appropriation of her identity against
the defendant, who featured a metallic robot dressed to resemble
the hair and style of dress of Vanna White in an advertisement
for its products.116 This interpretation of "identity," however, has
been widely criticized as too broad and unpredictable. 117
Although including protection for such transitory aspects of
one's personality as style and mannerisms is arguably extending
protection too far, New York should look to the California statute
itself, as opposed to interpretations of California's common law
voice because under Sections 50 and 51 there was no statutory claim for
misappropriation or imitation of voice); Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., 737 F. Supp. 826, 837-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), with Cerasani v. Sony Corp.,
991 F. Supp. 343, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that a cause of action under 50
and 51 included the improper use of plaintiff's "name, portrait, picture or
voice") (emphasis added).
113 See William M. Heberer, III, The Overprotection of Celebrity: A
Comment on White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 22 HOFSTRA L. REV.
729, 740 (1994).
114 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that Vanna White had a valid
publicity claim).
"1 Cirino, supra note 27, at 785 (citing White, 971 F.2d at 1398-99).
116 See White, 971 F.2d at 1401. The lawsuit involved an advertisement for
Samsung video cassette recorders, which featured a futuristic Wheel of Fortune
game show set that included a robot wearing a wig, evening gown, and jewelry
typical of the type worn by Vanna White on the actual television show. See id.
at 1396.
117 See White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514
(9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinild, J., dissenting from a denial of a petition for
rehearing) (stating that the majority's position "is a classic case of
overprotection" which "withdraws far more from the public domain than
prudence and common sense allow"); see also Heberer, supra note 113, at 731-
32 (disagreeing with the expansive reading of the right of publicity reached in
White, as it improperly removes from the public domain aspects of White's
performance "Which the Copyright Act has determined properly belong there").
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right, to provide individuals with some additional means of
protection. The amendment to include "voice" as a protected
attribute was a huge step in remedying the narrowness of the
New York claim. One further addition that could add to this
protection would be to include "signature" to the list of
attributes, as does the California statute. In so doing, New
York's right would provide individuals with adequate protection
of their identities while simultaneously maintaining the
predictability necessary to keep advertisers on notice of what
they can and cannot legally appropriate.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY
In order to address First Amendment concerns of freedom of
speech and public access to information, certain limitations are
placed on an individual's right of publicity. In New York, an
individual's right of publicity is limited in two important
respects: (1) a "newsworthiness" exception exists, prohibiting the
application of publicity rights when a person's identity is used
for "informational or communicative purposes," 118 and (2) a
person's right of publicity is restricted to only those
appropriations involving a "commercial use" of the identity.119
To restrain the right of publicity from becoming overly broad,
New York courts have established two further limitations. The
first is a requirement that the plaintiffs persona is
"recognizable" in the unauthorized appropriation, 120 and the
second is an exception for "incidental use."121
113 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity us. the First
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 93 (1994);
Lisa M. Ferri & Robert G. Gibbons, Skirting the Right of Publicity in the Wake
of 'Hoffman v. Capital Cities,' N.Y. L.J., Feb. 26, 1999, at 1.
119 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 1999) (stating that the right
covers "uses for advertising purposes, or for the purpose of trade"); see also
Goodman, supra note 2, at 239 (stating that a necessary element of a claim
under Sections 50 and 51 is that a plaintiff must prove that the use was "for
purposes of trade or advertising") (citing Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 472
N.E.2d 307, 308 (N.Y. 1984)).
120 See Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933-34 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1995); Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(holding that "a picture used for advertising purposes is not actionable under
the statute unless it is a clear representation of the plaintiff, recognizable from
the advertisement itself').
121 See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that when the advertisement "is merely incidental to a privileged use
there is no violation of § 51").
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A tension exists between an individual's interest in
protecting his or her identity from unauthorized use and the
ideals embodied within the First Amendment.' 22 Whereas the
First Amendment safeguards of freedom of speech and
expression seek to maximize public access to political,
informational, and entertainment works, 123 a right of publicity
enables individuals to control and restrict the public portrayal of
their personas. 124 Thus, a proper balance must be reached
between these countervailing interests. The ideals and policy
goals embedded within the First Amendment are so fundamental
to American democratic society that the right of publicity must
be limited in such a way as to prevent intrusion upon protected
speech and public interests. Thus, courts recognize a
"newsworthiness exception,"125 which prohibits the application of
a right of publicity claim "where a person's name or likeness is
used for informational or 'communicative' purposes."126 As a
general rule, "a person's right of publicity does not preclude
others from incorporating a person's name, features or biography
in a literary work, motion picture, news or entertainment
story."1 27 It is well established that newspapers, magazines, and
other forms of media need not obtain permission to write or
display images of persons in the news, or items "reasonably
related to ... matter[s] of public interest."128 In cases involving
the issue of "material newsworthiness," courts have "generally
held matters of public interest to be broadly defined."129
122 See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 100, at 1129-32; Kwall, supra note
120, at 47.
123 See Kwall, supra note 118, at 47 ("Traditional First Amendment
jurisprudence dictates that political, informational, and entertainment works
receive substantial protection, and seeks to maximize public access to these
works.").
124 See McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1704 (stating that the right of publicity
is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his
or her identity).
125 See Goodman, supra note 2, at 255 (stating that a court's distinction
between commercial use and an application of a newsworthiness exception
often determines whether there has been a violation of one's right of publicity).
126 Ferri & Gibbons, supra note 118, at 8.
127 Goodman, supra note 2, at 246 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp.
112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433
U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (holding that "[t]here is no doubt that entertainment, as
well as news, enjoys First Amendment protection").
128 Ferri & Gibbons, supra note 118, at 8.
129 Id.
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New York courts have consistently recognized such an
exemption for newsworthy materials and matters of legitimate
public interest. 130 In Davis v. High Society Magazine,1 1 the
court explicitly stated that when the challenged use of one's
name and likeness is considered "newsworthy" and a matter of
public interest, such uses are "protected by the First Amendment
and [are] not considered a use for the purposes of trade within
the ambit of the Civil Rights Law."13 2 The newsworthiness
exception has been applied to reports of political news and social
trends, articles of consumer concerns and fashion trends, and
matters of biological and scientific interest. 133
Another way in which legislatures ensure protection of the
public's access to information is to limit a right of publicity claim
to only those instances involving commercial use of the
persona, 34 in which "the First Amendment interest is relatively
low." 3 5 As stated earlier, New York Civil Rights Law sections 50
and 51 limit claims to uses "for advertising purposes or for the
purpose of trade."13 6 In order to account for the legitimate and
weighty First Amendment interests in these situations, courts
have consistently interpreted the statute to protect an
individual's personality from "misappropriation in [the]
commercial and advertising spheres only."1 37  Situations in
130 See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584
(N.Y. 1984) (stating that from the time of the Civil Rights Law's enactment,
courts have consistently held "that these terms should not be construed to
apply to publications concerning newsworthy events or matters of public
interest") (citations omitted).
131 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2d Dep't 1982).
132 Id. at 313; see also James v. Delilah Films, 544 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
133 See Finger v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141, 144 (N.Y.
1990); Stefano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 585 (N.Y.
1984); Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1982);
Pagan v. New York Herald Tribune, 301 N.Y.S.2d 120, 123 (1st Dep't 1969).
134 See Goodman, supra note 2, at 254-55 (pointing out that unauthorized
commercial use amounts to exploitation of an individual's likeness and
therefore gives rise to a right of publicity claim).
135 Felcher & Rubin, supra note 100, at 1130.
136 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1999); see also Arrington,
434 N.E.2d at 1321 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that the statute was narrowly drawn
to "encompass only the commercial use of an individual's name or likeness and
no more").
137 Delilah Films, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 451; see also Arrington, 434 N.E.2d at
1321 (holding that the statute applies solely to the commercial use of an
individual's name or likeness); McGraw v. Watkins, 373 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (3d
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which the use is considered a matter of public interest are
protected by the First Amendment and are therefore not
considered a use for the purposes of trade under the statute.138
Thus, the New York law safeguards First Amendment concerns
of free dissemination and public access to information by
providing exemptions for legitimate matters of public interest
and limiting the right to commercial uses. 139
It is important to note two further limitations imposed on
the right of publicity that prevent the claim from becoming
overly broad and therefore, encroaching on the public's ability to
access information. First, New York courts have recognized a
requirement that the reference to the person asserting the claim
be clear in the appropriation. Judicial interpretation of the Civil
Rights Law requires that a picture that is used for an
advertising purpose cannot be actionable unless it is a
"representation of the plaintiff, recognizable from the
advertisement itself."140 Second, there is a recognized exception
Dep't 1975) (holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's picture was not
for advertising purposes, and therefore was not within the prohibition of civil
rights law).
138 See Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (2d
Dep't 1982).
139 The following provide examples of instances where the courts of New
York have denied right of publicity claims because of a finding that a legitimate
public interest was involved: Nelson v. Globe Int'l Inc., 626 F. Supp. 969, 980
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding the newsworthiness exception to exist where a person's
diet was included in a tabloid publication); Arrington, 434 N.E.2d at 1323
(finding the photograph of a black financial analyst in a newspaper article to be
a matter of public interest); Virelli v. Goodson-Todman Enter., Ltd. 536
N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (3d Dep't 1989) (holding that the plaintiff did not state a
claim for invasion of privacy in an action brought over the publication of a
newspaper article relating to drug abuse because the challenged article dealt
with a newsworthy item); Rome Sentinel Co. v. Boustedt, 252 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14
(Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1964) (holding that sudden death in a place of public
accommodation clearly falls within the legitimate area of public concern).
140 Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see also
Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
(holding that the motion picture did not sufficiently portray the divorced wife of
Showman George M. Cohan to sustain a claim for violation of any right of
privacy); DiPortanova v. New York News Inc., 440 N.Y.S.2d 535, 535 (1st Dep't
1981) (holding that the published photograph of the home the article reported
was being built by the Shah of Iran was not readily recognizable as being the
plaintiffs home and thus dismissed the claim for invasion of privacy); Shamsky
v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995) (stating that
even though a reproduction of a World Series baseball team's picture was of
poor quality and the player's faces were small, the individual players faces were
identifiable and therefore they had grounds for a claim under the statute).
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for incidental use where either the use itself is "incidental,
momentary and isolated,"' 4' or the commercial aspect of the use
was merely incidental to some other protected purpose.142
Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law require that there be
more than an incidental connection between the appropriation of
a plaintiffs likeness and the main purpose of the work in order
to maintain a claim for invasion of privacy.143 Additionally, the
statute provides an exception for uses when the advertisement is
"merely incidental" to a privileged use.144 In DAndrea v. Rafla-
Demetrious,145 the court held a hospital's use of a medical
resident's picture in its recruiting brochure was not an invasion
of his right of privacy as the use was incidental to the main
purpose of the brochure, which was to provide information about
the hospital's programs to prospective employees. 46
CONCLUSION
In 1995, State Senator Emmanuel Gold proposed a bill to
amend the New York Civil Rights Law by adding an Article 5-b,
which would create a separate statutorily defined right of
publicity. 147 This newly-defined right would address many of the
problems inherent in recognizing a publicity claim rooted in
privacy law, as the right Senator Gold sought to introduce would
create a property right transferable in a person's lifetime and
descendible to heirs or chosen representatives upon death. 148
Thus, the statute would recognize every person, living or
deceased, has a property right in his or her identity.
141 Stillman v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 153 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191(lst Dep't
1956).
142 See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1984).
143 See Preston v. Martin Bergman Prod., Inc., 765 F. Supp 116, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the image of a scantily dressed woman walking
the streets of New York shown in the opening scenes of a motion picture was
not actionable because her appearance was incidental, and the statute requires
a greater connection between the appearance and the main purpose of the
work); Fleischer v. W.P.I.X., Inc., 213 N.Y.S.2d 632, 649 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1961) (dismissing the claim because the plaintiff's name was only incidentally
shown as part of the commencement of the film).
144 See Lerman, 745 F.2d at 130.
145 972 F. Supp. 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
146 See id. at 157 (noting that the fact that the brochure was in print and
that the plaintiff might be recognizable did not preclude application of the
incidental use doctrine).
147 See Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 1.
148 See Goodman, supra note 2, at 267.
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The advantages of such a property-based right are
enormous. First, it would provide individuals with some much-
needed additional protection over the manner in which their
image is spread into the public arena. Second, it would promote
economic creation incentives by allowing those who hold the
right to exploit it to their advantage. In addition, a property-
based right better represents the ideals embedded in the right of
publicity and the reasons justifying the need for its existence. In
most right of publicity cases, the plaintiffs complaint is not the
violation of a right to be let alone, but rather, that he or she was
deprived of the financial gain reaped from the unauthorized
publication of his or her image. Whereas in a privacy claim, the
right invaded and the measure of damages are based upon the
indignity and personal affront of having one's identity spread
into the public, a property-based right would more adequately
address the real harm suffered by the plaintiff. Damages would
be measured based on the nature and extent of the
appropriation. The plaintiff would recover "either compensatory
damages measured by the loss to the plaintiff or restitutionary
relief measured by the unjust gain to the defendant."149
In light of the strong policy arguments favoring the
recognition of a property-based right of publicity, this Note
maintains that New York should adopt a right similar to that
proposed by Senator Gold. In order to address many of the
concerns voiced by opponents of a more broadly defined right of
publicity, a New York right of publicity statute should
incorporate First Amendment limitations and principles directly
into the wording of the statute. This could be achieved by
maintaining the "commercial use" requirement of New York
Civil Rights Law Sections 50 and 51 and by explicitly
recognizing a "newsworthiness" exception in the statute. In
addition, the property-based right should more clearly define the
standard for determining the nature of the subject matter, e.g.,
whether a particular use is in fact a commercial use or whether
it falls within the newsworthiness exception.
"[N]othing is so strongly intuited as the notion that my
identity is mine-it is my property, to control as I see fit."150 An
individual's identity is his or her most intimate and precious
149 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
150 McCarthy, supra note 19, at 1711.
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commodity, a commodity for which he or she expends much time,
effort, skill, and money. In light of today's mass merchandizing
market and the fact that often the profits gained through
endorsements "far surpass the monies earned directly through
performances," 151 equitable considerations mandate that an
individual's right to exploit their image be adequately protected.
Considering the lucrative profits stemming from celebrity-driven
advertisement campaigns, should New York wish to "retain its
image as an important entertainment and cultural center," it is
imperative that the state institute "competitive laws favorable to
the interests of the performers."152 New York's recognition of a
separate and distinct property-based right of publicity would
ensure that celebrities are allowed to commercially exploit their
personas, their most valuable and expressive resource, to their
full advantage.
151 Marks & Mulvey, supra note 6, at 4.
152 Id. at 6.
1166 [Vol.74:1139
